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ABSTRACT
The legality of the Bowl Championship Series under the
federal antitrust laws has been the subject of much scholarly
commentary and Congressional inquiry. The results have been
mixed but the majority view seems to be that the BCS passes
muster under the Sherman Act. Most of the commentary has
examined the application of Section 1 with only passing attention
to Section 2. This article makes three points. First, it argues that
the focus on the BCS has obscured the attention to a broader set of
economic issues relating to the structure of the major college
* Henry Weihofen Chair in Law, and Acting Director, Africana Studies Program,
University of New Mexico, 2011. This article is dedicated to my brother Frank who
supported my education in high school, college and law school and to my niece Nicole
and nephew Mark, both of whom I was supposed to acknowledge at my law school
graduation and my sister-in-law Diane.
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football industry. The Bowl Championship Series and its
relationship to the Football Bowl Subdivision of the NCAA has
obscured focus on the development of major college football as an
oligopoly in which the firms are athletic conferences. The industry
is dominated by the BCS automatic qualifying conferences which
have engaged in conference expansion and realignments to
strengthen their dominance over the industry. Second, the article
acknowledges that the regulation of oligopolies has been
problematic under the antitrust laws but explores whether the
major college football oligopoly may present an appropriate case
for regulation as a cartel under section 1 or perhaps as a shared
monopoly under section 2. In exploring the application of the
Sherman Act to the major football conference oligopoly, this article
draws upon themes and analyses in European Community
competition law. Unlike the traditional oligopoly, the industry
conference members not only engage in parallel conduct but are
linked by explicit agreements such as the BCS and NCAA Bylaws
on conference structure and amateurism rules. Finally, assuming
a strong case can be made for the application of the Sherman Act
to the oligopoly, this article discusses whether traditional
antitrust remedies are feasible. Accordingly, this article
reluctantly considers the propriety of granting the NCAA a
limited exemption from the antitrust laws to permit it to regulate
the economic structure of intercollegiate athletics while
concomitantly subjecting it to oversight by the Department of
Education. This article thus calls for revolution not reform.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Bowl Championship Series has been the subject of
controversy since its inception. The BCS is a collaboration among
the organizers of four major bowls and the eleven Football Bowl
Subdivision (FBS) conferences ostensibly designed to produce a
national championship game in major college football.1 Unable to
produce a play-off, the BCS comes only close enough to produce a
match-up between the top two ranked college football teams and

I Christopher Pruitt, Debunking a PopularAntitrust Myth: The Single Entity Rule
and Why College Football's Bowl Championship Series Does Not Violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 125, 142 (2009).
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four highly quality matchups. Six conferences automatically
qualify for at least one berth in the lucrative bowl games. Colleges
and universities from five additional conferences, while not fully
excluded from participating, have a limited probability of
obtaining one of the remaining four slots. 2 Those universities,
their congressional delegations and fans have complained about
the unfairness of their exclusion from BCS games. 3 The fairness
questions relates not just to an opportunity for their teams to have
a chance to compete on the playing field in a BCS bowl game or
"national championship" game, but, to fundamental economic
issues. Universities that get to play in a BCS bowl game are
assured a substantial payday.
Individual universities, however, are only a part of the
equation. Conference membership is the key to the economic
payday. The BCS divides conferences into automatic qualifiers
and non-automatic qualifiers. A team that is a member of an
automatic qualifying conference playing in a BCS bowl shares the
payday with its conference and the other members of the
conference. 4 Six conferences are assured that a member school will
participate in the payday. . All other conferences are on the
outside looking in competing for a chance at not more than two
BCS bowl slots.5 However, they share any BCS payday with all of
the other non-automatic qualifying conferences, although the
participating conference will receive a substantial portion of the
payout.6 The arrangement means that automatic qualifying
conferences receive a revenue stream that enables them to
2 Non-automatic qualifying conferences may not obtain more than two of the
remaining four slots.
3 Michael McCann, Antitrust, Governanceand Postseason College Football,52 B.C.
L. REV. 517, 521 (2011).
1 Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl
Championship Series Still Draw A Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14 SPORTS LAW. J.
219, 232 (2007); M. Todd Carroll, Note, No Penalty on the Play: Why the Bowl
Championship Series Stays In-Bounds of the Sherman Act, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1235, 1248 (2004).
- Eric Blevins, College Football's BCS (Bowl Cartel System?): An Examination of
the Bowl ChampionshipSeries Agreement Under The Sherman Act, 18 SPORTS LAW. J.
153, 155-56 (2011)(post-2007 amendments); Katherine McClelland, Comment, Should
College Football's Currency Read "In BCS We Trust" or Is It Just Monopoly Money?:
Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Championship Series, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 167,
184-5 (2004)(rules prior to 2007 amendments).
6 Blevins, supra note 5, at 156.
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improve their programs and render them more competitive in the
market for top-tier coaches and athletes. The focus on the
antitrust laws is thus understandable. There are many other
bowls with significantly smaller paydays.7
The development and growth of the BCS has coincided with
the occurrence of a parallel development in major college football
that has routinely generated litigation but not the reprobation
afforded the BCS. Conference affiliations have fluctuated
historically but the 1990s ushered in an era of cataclysmic shifts.
A major shift occurred in 1996 with the demise of the Southwest
Conference. 8 Other conferences absorbed its member schools. The
Western Athletic Conference of which the University of New
Mexico was a member expanded to sixteen teams in 1999.9 The
arrangement was unwieldy and eight members left to form the
Mountain West Conference. 10 Neither the Mountain West
Conference nor the Western Athletic Conference has ascended to
the status of an automatic qualifier, although both have had one
or more teams qualify for a BCS berth.11

McClelland, supra note 5, at 176-77, 189-90; see also Amy Christian McCormick
and Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor's New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of
Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 513-14 (2008) (total revenue from all bowls in
2006 exceed $200 million).
I The Southwest Conference never recovered from the imposition of the NCAA's
death penalty on Southern Methodist University. See Maureen Weston, NCAA
Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. REV. 551, n.83 (2011); Glenn
Wong, Kyle Skillman, Chris Deubert, The NCAA's Infractions Appeals Committee:
Recent Case History, Analysis and the Beginning of A New Chapter, 9 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 47, n. 240 (2009). The University of Arkansas moved to the Southeast
Conference in 1990. See http://www.secsportsfan.com/sec-football-history.html . Baylor
University, Texas A&M University, Texas Tech University and the University of Texas
moved to the Big Eight Conference resulting in the Big Twelve Conference in 1996.
Mark Hales, The Antitrust Issues of NCAA College Football within the Bowl
Championship Series, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 97, n. 41. (2003). Rice University, Southern
Methodist University, and Texas Christian University then joined the Western Athletic
Conference and the University of Houston moved to Conference USA. Id.
I History
of
the
Wac,
WACSPORTS.COM,
July
15,
2011
http://www.wacsports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID=10100&ATCLID=537066.
1o About the Mountain West, THEMWC.COM, http://www.themwc.com/about/mwcabout.html.

11 BCS

selections

history,

BCSFOOTBALL.ORG,

http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=5528971. (The Mountain West Conference
has had two teams earn a BCS berth: University of Utah in 2005 and 2009, and Texas
Christian University in 2010 and 2011. The Western Athletic Conference has had two
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The next wave began in 2003 as conferences increased in size
in order to comply with NCAA rules to stage a conference
championship. The NCAA required a minimum of twelve teams to
hold a conference championship game. 12 To obtain the requisite
twelve, conferences began raiding other conferences. The Big East
became a major football conference in 1991 with the addition of
Rutgers, Miami, Temple, Virginia Tech, and West Virginia. 13 In
2003, however, the Atlantic Coast Conference lured Boston
College, the University of Miami and Virginia Tech away from the
Big East. 14 The Big East then added Louisville, Cincinnati, South
Florida, Marquette, and DePaul from Conference USA.15
Another wave of expansion began in 2010 as the automatic
qualifying conferences began trying to strengthen their dominance
of the market for major college football by adding members to
increase the quality of their product and concomitantly the value
of television rights. The expansion has gone further than the first
wave as strong automatic qualifying conferences have raided
weaker conferences. The Big Twelve conference has barely
survived. The Big East is in danger of losing its automatic
qualifying conferences after the Atlantic Coast Conference raided
it and West Virginia University took a lifeboat to the Big 12. The
Mountain West has been greatly damaged. First, Utah left in 2011
to join the PAC-12 and BYU left to operate as an independent
after negotiations to join the Big 12 failed. Then TCU bolted to
join the Big East, which it left for the Big 12. Finally, Boise State,
which joined in 2011, is moving to the Big East in 2013.16

teams earn a BCS berth: University of Hawaii in 2008, and Boise State University in
2007 and 2010).
12 National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2011-12 NCAA Manual, Bylaw 17.9.5.2
(2011).
18 Big East Conference, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BigEastConference#cite-ref7.
11 See Brian Favat, Why It 14ill Take More Than Money To Lure Boston College
Back
To
The
Big
East,
BC
Interruption
(Aug.
9,
2011),
http://www.bcinterruption.com/2011/8/9/2348582/big-east-expansion-rumors-bostoncollege-to-big-east.
1

Id.

16Erik Smith,

Boise State staying in Mountain West in 2012 bfore Big East mov,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
22,
2012),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2012/02/boise-statestaying- mountain-west- 2012 -big-east/1#.T4jVvVFPvFL.
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Participation in the BCS by a Mountain West Conference
institution has a significant economic impact on the fortunes of
the University of New Mexico, where I am a faculty member, even
though its participation in a BCS bowl in the near future is a
theoretical proposition regardless of the legality of the BCS. When
Texas Christian University (TCU) made it to the BCS in 2010,
UNM's share of the payday put the athletic program in the black
for the year.17 Similar economic fortunes occurred when Utah was
selected for BCS bowls in 2005 and 2009. When TCU upset Boise
State in the 2011-12 season, the latter lost its mandatory
eligibility for a BCS slot and the loss of a significant financial
windfall for the University of New Mexico.
Both waves frequently generated litigation as expanding
conferences acquired members from other conferences. Both the
exiting schools and the acquiring conferences have faced lawsuits
by the jilted conferences and its remaining members. 18
Notwithstanding the litigation, conference realignment has been
entertaining but has not generated the level of controversy of the
BCS.
Scholars and commentators have joined the fray examining
the legality of the BCS under the antitrust laws.19 Congress has

I James Monteleone, UNM Athletics Finishes In Black, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL,
Mon., Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2011/08/08/news/unm-athleticsfinishes-in-black.html.
11 Greg Katz, Note, Conflicting Fiduciary Duties Within Collegiate Athletic
Conferences: A Prescription for Leniency, 47 B.C. L. REV. 345, 356-60 (2006) (exiting
schools have had to defend claims of breach of covenant of good faith, breach of
fiduciary duty, promissory and equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment; the acquiring
conferences have faced claims for inducement to breach fiduciary duties, aiding and
abetting, breach of the implied duty of good faith as well as unjust enrichment); See
also Complaint, The Big East Conference v. West Virginia University, R.I.Sup. Ct.,
available
at
http://www.cbssports.com/images/collegefootball/bigeastcomplaint
11042011.pdf (Big East sues for injunctive relief for damages in what is essentially a
breach of contract action.) See also Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of
Contract and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Civ. Act. 11-C-695, West.Va. Cir. Ct,
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=84048b47-c82b-4392-b5edb38d68cl33eb. (West Virginia University filed an action seeking a declaratory
judgment in West Virginia).
19 Nathaniel Grow, Antitrust and the Bowl Championship Series, 2 HARV. J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 53 (2011); Jodi Warmbrod, Comment, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics:
Why Non-BCS Universities Should Punt Rather Than Go for an Antitrust Challenge to
the Bowl Championship Series, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 333 (2004); Carroll, supra note 4;
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held hearings and bills have been introduced into Congress. 20 The
obsession with the BCS has obscured focus on a broader set of
legal and economic issues pertaining to the structure of the major
college football industry. This article charts the transformation of
major college football into an oligopoly in which the firms
primarily consist of the eleven Football Bowl Subdivision
conferences rather than its 120 member institutions. It will argue
that the major college football industry is dominated by the six
BCS automatic qualifying conferences. It will show that the
transformation begins with the victory of major college football
powers in NCAA v. Board of Regents. 2 1 Unconstrained by the
NCAA, the major college football programs continued their drive
to attain dominance. Because unfettered competition among
individual institutions meant lower television revenues, the major
college programs sought to strengthen conferences as economic
units. The automatic qualifying conferences have used their
economic strength to negotiate television contracts, stage
championship games, obtain bowl tie-in agreements, divide
geographic markets and influence the shape of NCAA economic
rules. They have sought to buttress their economic power through
parallel actions to raid other conferences and expand. Moreover,
that dominance is cemented through two sets of explicit
agreements: the BCS and NCAA rules on amateurism, postseason eligibility and conference championship... This article thus
will explore whether the automatic qualifying conferences, not the
BCS, have liability as oligopolists under section 2.
This article acknowledges that the regulation of oligopolies
has been problematic under the antitrust laws but explores
whether the major college football oligopoly may present an
appropriate case for regulation as a cartel under section 1 or
perhaps as a shared monopoly under section 2. In exploring the
application of the Sherman Act to the major football conference
oligopoly, the article draws upon themes and analyses in

Hales, supra note 8; McClelland, supra note 5; Pruitt, supra note 1; Schmit, supra note
4, at 232.
20 Leslie Bauknight Nixon, Playoff or Bust: The Bowl Championship Series Debate
Hits Congress (Again), 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 365 (2009); Schmit, supra note 4, at 221.
21 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic Association, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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European Community competition law. Unlike the traditional
oligopoly, the industry conference members not only engage in
parallel conduct but also are linked by explicit agreements such as
the BCS and NCAA Bylaws on conference structure and
amateurism rules.
Finally, assuming a strong case can be made for the
application of the Sherman Act to the oligopoly, the article
discusses whether traditional antitrust remedies are feasible.
Accordingly, this article reluctantly considers the propriety of
granting the NCAA a limited exemption from the antitrust laws to
permit it to regulate the economic structure of intercollegiate
athletics while concomitantly subjecting it to oversight by the
Department of Education. This article thus calls for revolution not
reform.
Il. THE Focus ON THE BCS AND CONVENTIONAL ANTITRUST
ANALYSES
Many commentators have explored an antitrust challenge to
the BCS under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Most
attention in antitrust analyses has focused on Section 1 reflecting
a view that a claim based on that section is the most likely source
of a challenge. 22 The general consensus has been that the BCS
probably passes muster under a rule of reason analysis under
section 123 and that a section 2 challenge faces substantial
obstacles. 24 The basic criticism is that the major conferenceS 25
have created a post-season bowl system that excludes universities
in other mid-major conferenceS 26 from participating in the major
bowls and from equitably sharing in the revenues. 2 7 The
McCann, supra note 3, at 540.
Id., at 525.
21 Id., at 526.
2- The term "major conferences" refers to the six automatic qualifying conferences
in the BCS structure, but major conferences particularly when referring to the major
college football industry or oligopoly refers to the eleven conference members of the
NCAA's Football Bowl Subdivision.
2u Those other conferences refers to the five non-automatic qualifying conferences
in the BCS structure. They are sometimes referred to herein as the mid-majors.
27 See Brad Taconi, Third and Extremely Long: Why the Elimination of the BCS
Seems All But Impossible, 4 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 181, 205-06 (2010); Paul
Rogers, The Quest for Number 1 in College Football: The Revised Bowl Championship
Series, Antitrust and the Winner Take-All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 285,
22
21
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arguments have been that the usurpation of the major bowls and
their revenue streams by the automatic qualifying conferences
and the lack of influence in the BCS structure by non-automatic
qualifying conferences are anticompetitive. 28 The mere existence
of inequities, however, is not anticompetitive in the antitrust
sense. Some commentators have argued that the BCS constitutes
a group boycott or price-fixing resulting in harm to consumers by
reducing the quantity and quality of competitive bowls. 29
Commentators generally agree that the BCS would be
evaluated under the Rule of Reason because cooperation among
competing universities is necessary to offer any sort of national
championship play-off system. The BCS, while imperfect, at a
minimum guarantees the match-up of the two top-ranked teams, a
product that did not exist before its creation and that requires
cooperation among competitors to offer it. Universities from the
non-automatic qualifying conferences and elected officials in their
states have led the public outcry. 30 They do not necessarily oppose
a national championship but they oppose the BCS system, which
greatly restricts the opportunity for the outsider universities to
compete for the national championship and the big paydays.
Consequently, the vulnerability of the BCS system to an antitrust
challenge under section 1 probably depends upon whether there
are less restrictive alternatives. 31 The BCS system has been
revised to add a fifth bowl and two additional bowl slot chances for
non-automatic qualifying conferences due to this test. 32 The BCS
is considering additional changes as the criticism has continued
unabated. 33

288-90 (2008); David Scott Moreland, Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Bowl
Championship Series: Analysis Through Analogous Reasoning, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
721,741-42 (2005); McCann, supra note 3.
28 McCann, supra note 3, at 527-28; McClelland, supra note 5, at 1271.
29 K. Todd Wallace, Elite Domination of College Football: An Analysis of the
Antitrust Implications of the Bowl Alliance, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 57, 75-76 (1999); Grow,
supra note 19.
so Pruitt, supra note 1, at 126-27; Taconi, supra note 27, at 203-06.
31 Blevins, supra note 5, at 174-79; McClelland, supra note 5, at 1282-84.
32 Grow, supra note 19, at 77-80 (commentator asserts that recent changes do not
negate group boycott or price-fixing claims).
11 Gene
Wojciechowski,
Sources:
BCS
proposes
radical
changes,
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7248953/bcs-proposes-only-handlingnational-championship -game -sources -say (Nov. 19, 2011); BCS officials to discuss
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At least one commentator has argued that section 1 is
inapplicable because the BCS system constitutes a single entity
for the purposes of Section 1 negating the duality requirement. 34
He argues that separate universities join to produce the BCS, that
such cooperation is necessary and that accordingly the BCS
system should be per se legal under this section. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected the essence of his argument but the
commentator relied upon the appellate court decision in American
Needle v. NFL, a decision subsequently rejected by the Supreme
Court. 35 The single entity defense is worth noting because if the
BCS were so recognized, it is still not out of the antitrust woods.
Section 2, the antimonopoly provisions, looms large.
Less attention has been given to potential Section 2 claims in
the commentary even though popular critiques have characterized
the BCS system as a monopoly. 36 Again, the perceived unfairness
does not easily translate into antitrust claims. One section 2
argument is that the automatic qualifying conferences have
conspired to give themselves the market power to reduce the
output of post-season bowl games and dictate the price of
broadcast rights and consumer ticket prices for those bowls. 37 The
assertion of market power means that you have to identify a
relevant product and geographic market. Here the argument is
that the automatic qualifying conferences have illegally obtained
monopoly power in the market for a national major college football
championship game or the major bowls. 38
One reason commentators do not dwell on Section 2 are the
perceived difficulties in making a case under the requirements of
that section. Professor Michael McCann has provided a brief
treatment of a section 2 claim. 39 First, the section primarily
applies to the conduct of a single firm and the BCS system

changes,
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7442352/bowl-championshipseries-officials- discuss -possible -format- changes (Jan. 10, 2012). .
8' Pruitt, supra note 1, at 146-51.
American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2009),
reversed, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).
6 Supra note 27.

See Rogers, supra note 27, at 299-300; see also Blevins, supra note 5, at 169
(argument that BCS has monopoly on major college national championship game).
11 McClelland, supra, note 5, at 188; Rogers, supra note 27, at 299.
39 McCann, supra note 3, at 540-41.
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involves conferences, bowl organizations, the NCAA and its
member institutions. 40 The heart of a section 1 claim is the
existence of an agreement to restrain trade. Accordingly, most
commentators have devoted some effort to describing the
structure and agreements of the BCS. For example, Professor
McCann drawing upon the self-description on the BCS website
alludes to a "five-game showcase" to match the top two rated
college football teams and four additionally highly competitive
bowl games. 4 1 He then refers to colleges and universities that are
members of the Football Bowl Subdivision of the NCAA and also
the six BCS-affiliated conferences and five non-BCS affiliated
conferences. 42
Secondly, a plaintiff must show that the defendant possesses
monopoly power in a relevant market. 43 A section 1 violation
merely requires the possession of market power. The distinction
may be of little conceptual significance in this instance whether
the relevant market is the market for a national major college
football championship game, or the BCS bowl games or the
televising of BCS bowl games. 44 The BCS possesses market power
in all three of those markets and moreover it has sufficient power
to constitute monopoly power. 45 Thirdly, even if a firm possesses
monopoly power, it does not necessarily violate Section 2. It must
have acquired the monopoly power in an illegal manner or used its
monopoly power to maintain its monopoly.46 It is permissible if the
monopoly was thrust upon it or resulted from superior skill or
knowledge. 47
Virtually all of the commentary views the BCS in isolation
when evaluating the potential antitrust claims. By limiting the
focus to the BCS, the commentators have spent little time
examining the dominance of the automatic qualifying conferences
over major college football. Early examination of cartel behavior in
intercollegiate athletics was directed at the NCAA. In fact, many

Io

McClelland, supra note 5 at 195.

"

McCann, supra note 3, at pp. 517-18.
Id. at 518.
McCann supra note 3, at 540.
McCann, supra note 3, at 535, 540.

'

Id., at 540-41.

'1

12
'

iu Id.

I Id.
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of the articles examining the BCS refer to the role of the NCAA
but do not target it as the culprit. Such analysis today would be
misplaced. Major college intercollegiate athletics is driven by the
economics of football4 8 and the NCAA has been unable to regulate
the emergence of an oligopoly that controls or strongly influences
it. In any case, the attention given to the BCS has obscured the
development of an oligopoly dominated by its half-dozen automatic
qualifying conferences. The scant attention to Section 2 or rather
the emphasis on section 1 has meant very little analysis of the
industry structure and its regulation under the antitrust laws or
otherwise. There have been calls for legislative responses to
address the perceived inequities of the BCS49 but not the larger
problem of industry structure.
Neither modifications to the BCS format or the adoption of an
NCAA championship playoff will alleviate the industry structure
concerns. The problem is not that the BCS constitutes a cartel but
that the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision, formerly Division I, is
an oligopoly dominated by a small number of elite university
programs, but dominated by a small number of conferences.5 0
III. EMERGENCE OF THE MAJOR CONFERENCE OLIGOPOLY
The oligopoly story begins when five major conferences and
several major independents formed the College Football
Association in 1977.51 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in
'1 The
Second Century Imperatives, Presidential Leadership -Institutional
Accountability, A Report from the Presidential Task Force on the Future of Division I
Intercollegiate
Athletics
2-024
(2006),
available
at
http://facsen.wsu.edu/items-of-interest/athletics/NCAA/NCAAPresidentialTaskForcefi
nalreportOctO6.pdf..
19 Nixon, supra note 20; Schmit, supra note 4; for a contrary view, see Timothy
Kober, Too Many Men on the Field: Why Congress Should Punt on the Antitrust Debate
Overshadowing Collegiate Football and the Bowl Championship Series, 15 SETON HALL
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 57 (2005).
o The Football Bowl Subdivision consists of eleven conferences: Atlantic Coast
Conference, Big East Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve Conference, Big Sky
Conference, Conference USA, Missouri Valley Conference, Mountain West Conference,
Pac-12 Conference, Southeastern Conference, and Western Athletic Conference.
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/teamindex.htm.
1 The College Football Association membership consisted of the Atlantic Coast,
Big 8, Southeastern, Southwestern and Western Athletic Conferences and the
independents, University of Notre Dame, Pennsylvania State University, University of
Pittsburgh and the military academies. Board of Regents, University of Oklahoma v.
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NCAA v. Board of Regents, the NCAA controlled television rights
to NCAA Division I football. 52 Under its contracts with the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the Columbia
Broadcasting Systems (CBS), member schools were limited in the
number of television appearances over a two-year period and
revenues were governed by a price scale. 53 Thus, the NCAA
television controls provided for revenue sharing of television
revenues among NCAA members. The more popular major
university programs capable of generating high revenues because
of high demand but bearing high costs were in essence sharing
revenue with less popular university programs with lower
revenues, demand and costs. Desiring a better revenue sharing
arrangement that permitted them to keep more of the revenue,
the College Football Association members sought control over
their television rights and attempted to negotiate their own
contract with the National Broadcasting Company. 54 When the
NCAA threatened to expel them from membership, two
universities that were members of the College Football
Association challenged the NCAA contract on antitrust grounds.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contract constituted an
unreasonable restraint against trade.5 5
NCAA v. Board of Regents was a monumental ruling. The
courts at each level of NCAA v. Board of Regents inartfully tried to
articulate a distinction between the commercial activities of the
NCAA and its educational and athletics governance activities.5 6
The courts suggested, albeit for different reasons, that its
educational functions did not shield the NCAA from antitrust

National Collegiate Athletic Association, 546 F.Supp. 1276, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 1982);
468 U.S. 89; Alfred Dennis Mathewson, By Education or Commerce: The Legal Basis
for the Federal Regulation of the Economic Structure of Intercollegiate Athletics, 76
UMKC L.REV. 597, 617-18 (2008). The members of those conferences and the
independents were upset with the NCAA revenue sharing structure.
52 The NCAA had controlled football television rights since the 1950's but did not
clearly assert its authority to do so until 1981 after the College Football Association
questioned that authority. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1283-85.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, at 468 U.S. 91-94.
'

Id.

at 94-95.

Id. at 468 U.S. 120.
Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting
Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1994).
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scrutiny.5 7 The Supreme Court touched the issue in passing by
dismissing an exemption due to the nonprofit status of the NCAA
or the educational nexus.5 8 While the Court sanctioned its role in
regulating amateur intercollegiate athletics, it also nixed the
NCAA's control of television rights and also effectively precluded
the NCAA from regulating the economic structure of
intercollegiate athletics.59 The members of the College Football
Association were given the green light to promote their economic
self-interest, as the NCAA could not regulate their economic
activity without violating the antitrust laws.6 0 'The Court
expressed its approval in of the NCAA's governance in NCAA v.
Tarkanian, a case with claims of procedural overreaching and
unfairness by the NCAA.61
A glut of college football programming resulted after NCAA v.
Board of Regents as individual universities were free to compete
against each other in selling television rights. 62 Universities thus
recognized that some restraints on the competition were desirable
if prices were to stabilize. The solution was conference contracts.
Conferences presented a significantly smaller number of firms
selling television rights than the then nearly 200 universities
operating Division I football programs. The question was whether
conference contracts would violate the antitrust laws in the same
manner as the NCAA contract. The courts ruled differently. In
Regents of the University of California v. American Broadcasting
Co., the PAC-10 TV contract was the subject of an antitrust

Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d. 1147, 1153-55 (10th Cir. 1983); Board of
Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.Supp. 1288-89.
" NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 100-02.
" The result was seconded in Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); cet.
denied, NCAA v. Law, 525U.S. 822 (1998).
uo Although the Supreme Court construed the antitrust laws to preclude regulation
of the commercial activities of member institutions, it has allowed the NCAA to
regulate the economic relationship between universities and student athletes. NCAA v.
Board of Regents, at 468 U.S. 102. The Department of Justice has not taken that the
position with respect to the economic relationship between universities and faculty
members, see infra note 164, or universities and non-student athletes, see infra note
164.
1 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
62 D. Kent Meyers and Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
Works Occasionally: Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, A Case
In Point, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 699-708 (1995).
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challenge based on Board of Regents. 63 The conferences presented
smaller economic joint arrangements competing against each
other rather than the monopolistic NCAA control. 64 When the
court upheld the PAC-10 contract, it paved the way for
conferences to engage in competition for TV contracts. As
competitors, the conferences naturally had the objective of
strengthening their position in the market place. 65
The demise of the Southwestern Conference led to a further
development. The Southeastern Conference and the Big Eight
were the first conferences to benefit upon the collapse of the
Southwest Conference after the NCAA imposed the death penalty
on Southern Methodist University and other scandals occurred in
the conference.6 6 The SEC added Arkansas in 1991 along with
South Carolina. With twelve members, it successfully requested
permission from the NCAA to stage a championship game. 67 A
championship game meant additional television revenue for a
conference. As other conferences were interested in following the
SEC, the NCAA subsequently amended its bylaws to permit a
conference to hold a championship game provided that it had at
least 12 members. 68 The Big 8 rose to twelve members when it
added Texas, Texas Tech, Baylor and Texas A&M to become the
Big 12. Like the SEC, it divided into two divisions, staged a
championship under the NCAA bylaw, and increased the value of
its television rights in the process. The WAC tried to follow suit by
adding eight teams in 1996 but it did not achieve the desired
success and eight teams seceded and formed the Mountain West
Conference in 1999.69

G3 747 F.2d 511 (1984); Ass'n Independ. Telev. Stations, Inc. v. College Football
Ass'n, 637 F. Supp
1289 (W.D. Okla. 1986). See also Stephen Ross,
An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 Emory L.J.
463, 475-82 (1990) (package sales of broadcast rights should be evaluated under the
rule of reason).
GI Meyers and Horowitz, supra note 62, at 698-99.
G- Christian Dennie, Changingthe Game: The Litigation That May Be the Catalyst
for Change in IntercollegiateAthletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 17 (2012). (example of
SEC television contract with ESPN).
G6 Weston, supra note 8, at n.83.
G- About the Mountain West, http://www.themwc.com/about/mwc-about.html.

G8 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12.

G9 See text supra at 10 and accompanying notes.
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Other
conferences
were interested
in adding
the
championship game. The Atlantic Coast Conference was one such
conference but it needed twelve members. By 2003, it decided to
act. With only eight members and no conference collapse on the
horizon, it needed to raid an existing conference and it targeted
the Big East. However, it was initially only able to get to 11
schools during the first wave of conference realignment because of
litigation over the addition of Boston College. 70 The litigation was
resolved and it staged its first championship game in 2005.71 The
Big East began as a basketball conference but strengthened its
claim as football conference with strong programs at BC, Miami,
Pittsburgh, Syracuse and VT. Its configuration has always made it
vulnerable to raiding. Conference USA emerged as a mid-major.
The first wave of expansion was complete. 72 The Big Ten added
Penn State in its march toward 12 schools. 73
In the second wave of conference realignment beginning in
2010, the Big Ten and Pac-10 sought to increase its
competitiveness. In 2010, the Big Ten raided the Big 12 by luring
Nebraska to give it 12 schools-it had added Penn State in 1990.
It held its inaugural championship game in 2011. The PAC-10
raided the Big 12 and the Mountain West to add Colorado and
Utah giving it the magic 12 and a conference championship game.
In 2011, the ACC followed less than a year later by announcing
that Pittsburgh and Syracuse would leave the Big East,
apparently in a march toward sixteen members. The SEC
countered with the additions of Missouri and Texas A&M from the
Big 12. 74 There were rumors that Oklahoma, Oklahoma State,
Texas and Texas Tech would abandon the Big 12 and move to the
Pac-12 creating a 16 team conference. However, the Pac-12
presidents announced that they had no interest in expanding at

,o Katz, supra note 18, at 352.
I Id., at 358.
,2
Schmit, supra note 4; Beth Rosenberg, Division I-A conference realignment has
had
emotional,
structural
impact
(Dec.
8,
2003),
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2003/Division+I/domino+effect+-+12-803.html.
Meyers and Horowitz, supra note 62, at 704.
Texas A&M's move to the Southeastern Conference was placed on hold. Texas
A&M had to make the move.
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this time.75 TCU, whom previously had agreed to join the Big
East, decided to join the Big 12 or what was left of it. Amid the
uncertainty, West Virginia defected from the Big East to join the
Big 12.76 The Big East, reeling from the loss of Pittsburgh and
Syracuse, responded by raiding the Mountain West and
Conference USA.77
All of the BCS automatic qualifying conferences, except the
Big East have the required twelve members and hold
championship
games. As the BCS automatic qualifying
conferences have matched each other with the recent expansion
moves, they have had to raid other conferences. It is raiding
because the added schools have primarily been members of
existing
conferences
with contractual
obligations.
Most
conferences now have some form of exit fee if a member breaches
its contractual obligations by leaving to join another conference.
While there may be negotiations and litigation over the amount of
the fee, the exiting school generally anticipates that the gains
from the new conference will cover the fee. Nevertheless, an
expanding conference necessarily must induce a new member to
breach its contractual obligations or be willing to accept a new
member that will breach its obligations.78
Notwithstanding the exit fees, the non-automatic qualifying
conferences will necessarily suffer losses and must take some
action in order to survive. They may be expected to raid the
Football Championship Subdivision conferences or merge. The
Mountain West has been hit by the expansion of two conferences,
the PAC-12 and the Big East. Conference USA has been raided

Chris Dufresne, Pac-12 says no to further expansion: Texas and Oklahoma won't
bolt Big 12 for superconference-for now, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 20, 2011,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011- 09- 20/sports/chi-pacl2 -officials -say-they-wontexpand-20110920_1_pac- 12-commissioner-larry-scott-super-conference.
However, the move did not come without litigation from the Big East
Conference. The Big East Conference v. West Virginia University, Complaint, PB-116391 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2011).
The Big East added Boise State University and San Diego State University from
the Mountain West and University of Houston and Southern Methodist University
from Conference USA. It has also added the U.S. Naval Academy, the University of
Memphis and Temple University. Mark Peloquin, Conference Realignment, COLLEGE
SPORTS INFO.COM. http://collegesportsinfo.com/conference-realignment-grid/#BigEast.
Conference realignment is not new. Universities have changed conferences with
some frequency. Katz, supra note 18, at 349-50.
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twice by the Big East, the latter which has been raided twice by
the Atlantic Coast Conference and faces the specter of additional
losses as the ACC contemplates a sixteen member conference. The
magic number for the Big East, however, is eight, the minimum
needed to maintain its BCS-automatic qualifying status.
Conference realignment is but one aspect of the development
of conference economic power after NCAA v. Board of Regents. In
1984, there were four major post-season bowls held on New Year's
Day: Cotton, Orange, Rose and Sugar.7 9 Historically, the Rose
Bowl had a tie-in agreement to match the champion of the Big Ten
against the PAC-10 champion.8 0 The pollsters selected a national
champion after the New Year's Day Bowls. The arrangement
generated frequent controversy and ongoing calls for a playoff in
major college football. The Sugar Bowl had a similar tie-in
agreement with the SEC. Less than a decade after NCAA v. Board
of Regents, a movement began to use the bowls to produce a
national championship game. The first effort was the Bowl
Coalition in 1991.81 It was followed by the Bowl Alliance in 1995.
However, both efforts failed because of the unwillingness of the
Big Ten and PAC-10 to give up the Rose Bowl tie-in. By the late
1990s, those two conferences agreed to join the BCS. What the
collective membership of the College Football Association failed to
achieve in 1984 had now come to fruition. The major conferences,
the automatic qualifying conferences, have achieved market
dominance in the major college football industry.
IV. TACKLING THE BCS OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM
Major college football has all the ingredients of an
oligopolistic industry. An oligopoly is highly concentrated with a
small number of sellers controlling most of the sales in a
homogenous product in the market. 82 Oligopoly theory predicts
that competing firms are interdependent because each firm

Schmit, supra note 4, at 222-228.
8o McClelland, supra note 5, at 176.
81Jasen R. Corns, Comment, Pigskin Paydirt: The Thriving of College Football's
Bowl Championship Series in the Face of Antitrust Law, 39 TULSA L. REV. 167 (2003).
82 Thomas Piraino, Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89
MINN. L. REV. 9 (2004) citing ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 192 (1985).
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recognizes that it is able to affect the profits of its competitors and
so thus must contemplate the reaction of competitors to measures
taken by them. 83 As a result, firms may engage in parallel conduct
in the natural course of the industry. Accordingly, industry
structure allows competing firms to coordinate their behavior
without express agreements among them. 84 Major college football
has a small number of firms. It currently consists of the 11
conferences comprising NCAA's Football Bowl Subdivision.85 If the
merger of Conference USA and the Mountain West is
consummated,8 6 that number will be reduced to ten. The
conferences produce a regular season of college football and postseason bowl games that are televised regionally and nationally
among NCAA Division 1 caliber programs. The industry is
dominated by six major firms, the BCS-automatic qualifying
conferences. The structure of the market enables the conferences
to extract higher bowl payouts than would be generated in a
competitive market.
All eleven conferences have engaged in ongoing parallel
conduct. First, the conferences have bowl tie-in agreements, a
practice that predates the BCS, with at least one bowl.8 7 There are
thirty non-BCS bowls.88 The automatic qualifying conferences
have arrangements with the stronger bowls. The non-automatic
qualifying conferences have adopted the practice, even with
recently established bowls. Second, the major conferences have
expanded to add schools and the other conferences have
responded. Third, each FBS conference has a television contract
although individual schools may have local radio and television
contracts.8 9 Some schools have their own cable networks.9 0 The

11Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 659-66 (1962).
Piraino, supra note 82, at 9.
"
Taconi, supra note 27, at 185.

8'

86See infra note

94.

Brett P. Fenasci, An Antitrust Analysis of College Football'sBowl Championship
Series, 50 LOY. L. REV. 967, 973-74 (2004); Grow, supra note 15, at 61-62; Hales, supra
note
10,
at
101;
Automatic
bids
to
college
bowl
games,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic-bids-to-collegebowl-games (list of bowls and
tie-ins).
88 Automatic
bids
to
college
bowl
games,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic-bids-to-collegebowl-games.
81 McCormick, supra note 7, at 511-13.
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automatic qualifying conferences have satellite radio channels as
well. Fourth, each conference has some form of revenue sharing
arrangement.9 1 As noted above, conferences
are adding
championship games provided they can expand to the minimum
twelve. The SEC and ACC are eyeing expansion to sixteen. 92
Others may follow even though the PAC-12 has declined for now. 93
Conference USA and the Mountain West, in an effort to survive,
had agreed to merge to create a conference of at least sixteen
teams, but the merger is now doubtful. 94 Finally, expansion means
raiding existing conferences; that is an expanding conference must
lure or accept a school that is contractually a member of an
existing conference. The automatic qualifying conferences have led
these moves. .
Regulating the major football conference oligopoly, however,
under the antitrust laws does not appear promising. Any plaintiff
faces the "oligopoly problem." 95 One commentator asserts the
problem consists of two components: the oligopoly gap96 and the

90

Gary Dinges, Longhorn Network to Launch Aug. 26; First Slate of Shows

Announced,

AMERICAN-STATESMAN,

June

15,

2011,

http://www.statesman.com/sports/longhorns/longhorn-network-to-launch-aug-26-firstslate- 1542246.html ; Ty Duffy, Longhorn Network Contract Between Texas and ESPN
Revealed,
Big
12
Future
Not
Bright,
Aug.
8,
2011,
http://thebiglead.com/index.php/2011/08/08/longhorn-network-contract-between-texasand-espn- revealed-big- 12 -future -not-bright/; Val Sikahema, Jealousy Abounds over
BYU,
Texas
network
deals,
Deseret
News,
Aug.
5,
2011,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705388736/Jealousy-abounds-over-BYU-Texasnetwork-deals.html.
91Carroll, supra note 4, at n.61.
92 Syracuse, Pitt to the ACC: Will conference's expansion continue to 16 teams?,
Associated
Press,
http://blog.syracuse.com/sports/2011/09/syracuse-pitt-to-the-acc will.html.
93 Supra note 80.
9' Matt Peloquin, CUSA and Mountain West to Form New Conference, COLLEGE
SPORTS INFO.COM. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://collegesportsinfo.com/2012/02/08/cusamountain-west-merger-progresses/ ; Matt Peloquin, CUSA/Mountain West Merger on
Hold,
COLLEGE
SPORTS
INFO.COM.,
(Mar.
26,
2012),
http://collegesportsinfo.com/2012/03/26/no- all-sports -merger-for-cusamountain/.
9- Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Piraino, supra note 82.
96Barry E. Hawk, Oligopolies and Collective Dominance: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, Treviso Conference on Antitrust Between EC Law and National Law at p. 6263, Eighth Edition, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301693 (2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1301693.
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unproved cartel gap. 97 First, the language of the Sherman Act
does not neatly fit oligopolies. Section 1 requires an agreement
and firms in oligopolies by their nature act in parallel without
necessarily entering into an agreement. Section 2 on the other
hand attacks the monopolization of a market by a single firm and
an oligopoly involves dominance by a group of firms. Second,
proving the existence of an agreement to act as a cartel is difficult
given that the firms may reach tacit agreements that are masked
by their tendency to take parallel action without having to reach
an agreement. The conscious parallelism doctrine has been used to
describe this phenomenon.9 8 It is well settled that parallel conduct
by firms in an oligopoly does not establish an agreement under
Section 1.99 The courts have adopted the "plus factors" test
requiring a plaintiff to establish additional circumstances or
facilitating devices from which an agreement may be inferred.10 0
Those factors usually must show conduct by firms that are
inconsistent with their independent economic self-interest.1 0 1

a. Case for Cartel
Lawyers have primarily sought to apply section 1 to
oligopolistic conduct because it regulates monopolistic in an
oligopolistic industry where no single firm will have attained
monopoly status to trigger section 2. It is that group of dominant
firms in the industry that engage in conduct that attains,
maintains or tends toward monopoly. The issue is the existence of
the agreement. 102
The conscious parallelism doctrine and its plus factors
complement need only be resorted to in the absence of an explicit
conspiracy. An explicit agreement to cartelize an industry clearly
violates section 1. Cartels are groups of competing firms that join

97 Id.
91 Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 589 (2010).
99 Piraino, supra note 82, at n. 72.
100Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99
CAL. L. REV. 683, 749-52(2011).
101 Id. at 750.

102 Interstate Circuit v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 59 S.Ct. 467, 83 L.Ed. 610 (1939);
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 74 S.Ct. 257,
98 L.Ed. 273 (1954).
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to monopolize a market. 103 Long before the BCS, critics
characterized the NCAA as a cartel.104 The case for cartel is even
stronger in the case for today's major college football industry.
Focus on the BCS arrangement does not capture and is
insufficient to address the full extent of that cartel. The argument
is that BCS automatic qualifying conferences have formed a cartel
to dominate the market for major college football including
television and post-season bowls.
The case for this cartel begins with explicit agreements.
Collaboration among rival universities and conferences is needed
in order to produce regular season, post-season bowl competition
or a national championship system. As a result, the major college
conferences, including the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences
are or have been parties to at least three sets of agreements. First,
the conferences in the major college football industry are members
of the NCAA and its Football Bowl Subdivision. They must
cooperate on game rules, eligibility, amateurism, officiating, and
scheduling. Second, sixty-four university program members, a
number too large to render it an effective cartel, entered into the
College Football Association agreements with the specific purpose
of obtaining more influence in the promulgation of NCAA rules
affecting major college programs. Third, the FBS conferences are
parties to the BCS agreements. 105 The BCS-automatic qualifying
conferences are the successors to the College Football Association.
However, the cooperation among the major conferences goes well
beyond that needed to produce major college football or a playoff
system.
The NCAA has adopted several bylaw provisions that favor
the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences. As noted above, the
NCAA authorizes conferences to stage a conference championship

10 See infra note 109.
101 James v. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organizations, 61 IND.

L.J. 9 (1986) (commentator argues that intercollegiate athletics is an industry whose
firms are colleges and universities). However, Cartels are more likely to effective with
relatively few numbers because members have incentives to cheat. A large numbers
makes cheating more difficult to prevent or contain.
1o- Originally, only the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences were parties. The
agreements were amended in 2004 to include the remaining FBS conferences. See,
Pruitt, supra note 1, at 142.(author describes four sets of agreements establishing
BCS).,
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game provided the conference had twelve members.106 The NCAA
amended its rules to permit Division 1 institutions to play twelve
regular season games. 107 Additional regular season games mean
more gate receipts and television revenues. As members of the
FBS, they have been able to participate in the maintenance of
amateurism standards and the promulgation of rules that
specifically apply to conferences. The amateurism rules, which
prohibit universities from paying student athletes, preclude
universities in the non-automatic qualifying conferences from
competing for talent with price.
There are also barriers to entry. First, competing at the
major college level requires substantial investment and annual
expenditures.1 08 Commentators have described an arms race in
intercollegiate
athletics
in
which
wealthier
institutions
continually spend more and thereby driving up the costs that
other institutions must spend.10 9 Second, financial barriers to
entry are also imposed by NCAA rules. To be eligible for FBS
membership, a university must carry a minimum number of male
and female athletic teams, offer specified levels of athletic
scholarships and meet minimum attendance levels.1 10
The major college football oligopoly comprised of the FBS
conferences is different from the prototypical oligopoly in that the
members must cooperate in producing the product. That
cooperation is reflected in the NCAA bylaws. Cooperation is also
needed to produce a national championship or a bowl game
matching the top two ranked teams against each other. This

Io
Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A
New Critique of the NCAA's Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 51, n. 108
(2006); McCormick, supra note 7, at 512.
10o Nathaniel Grow, Louisville i. Duke and Its Implications for Breached College
Football Scheduling Agreements, 37 J.C. & U.L. 239, n.20 (2011), citing, Liz Clarke,
College Football Gets 12th Game: NCAA Approves Move for 2006, Wash. Post, April
29, 2005, at DO; NCAA MANUAL Bylaw, § 17.9.5.1.
1os John R. Maney, Train Wreck (of the I-AA), 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 279
(2012).
10 Matthew J. Mitten, James L. Mussleman, Bruce W. Burton, Targeted Reform of
Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 801-02 (2010);
Rodney K. Smith, Increasing PresidentialAccountability in Big-Time Intercollegiate
Athletics, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 298-99 (2003); Mathewson, supra note 51,
at 615.
110 Nixon, supra note 20, at 386.
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cooperation, however, guarantees a matchup that virtually
assures that at least one team from an automatic qualifying
conference will play in the championship, which serves to foster
and maintain the dominance of the automatic qualifying
conferences over the market.
Each automatic qualifying conference has independent
economic reasons to belong to the FBS as well as the BCS. A
conference could seek to start a rival bowl alliance but the history
of the Bowl Coalition and Bowl Alliance showed that the
guarantee of a unified national championship game will generate
more television and bowl revenue than competing bowl systems.111
That was the case when the Big Ten and the PAC-10 maintained
their tie-ins with the Rose Bowl under the Bowl Alliance. 112 The
BCS-automatic qualifying conferences also have independent
reasons to agree to a bowl system that favors their conferences
over the non-automatic qualifying conferences.
Conferences, both automatic qualifiers and non-automatic
qualifiers, have independent reasons to expand, and to raid other
conferences. The larger the conference, the larger the television
market, or footprint, for the conference, not taking into account
the post-season bowl revenue. A large number of conference
teams, however, does not automatically assure a large television
contract. The Western Athletic Conference, for example, expanded
to sixteen teams in the mid-nineties. 113 The conference primarily
consisted of mid-major schools. The geographic area was spread
across the western United States and extended to Hawaii. Most of
the schools did not have natural rivalries within the conference
nor large followings at home. After a few years, the larger schools,
most of them original members of the WAC, defected to form the
Mountain West Conference. 114 Nevertheless, the creation of the
M11
Corns, supra note 81 (history of Bowl Coalition, Bowl Alliance and Bowl
Championship Series); Carroll, supra note 4, at 1247-49 (2004); Schmit, supra note 4,
at 230-31.
112 Id.
113 http://www.wacsports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID=10100&ATCLID=.
M11Since 1962, several changes have occurred. UTEP and Colorado State became
members in September 1967, while Arizona and Arizona State withdrew on June 30,
1978. The WAC then added San Diego State (1978), Hawai'i (1979) and Air Force
(1980). Before 1990, the WAC sponsored championships only in men's sports. However,
a merger with the High Country Athletic Conference formed a single conference under
one administrative structure, and the 1990-91 athletic year was the first in which both
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BCS and the conference expansion moves indicate actions
initiated by the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences to maintain
dominance in an oligopoly.
Intercollegiate athletics are supposed to constitute an
integral part of the educational programs of the NCAA's member
institutions.1 1 5 The traditional university rivalries are something
that general student bodies thrive on and savor as a part of the
educational experience. When Texas A&M fled to the SEC, it
turned its back on the century old rivalry with the University of
Texas. The annual game was a major event on the campuses in
Austin and College Station. Texas A&M moved for purely
economic reasons. As a member of the Big Twelve, Texas A&M
was already a member of a BCS conference. However, the Big
Twelve television rights were not as lucrative. 116 Moreover, the
University of Texas established the very successful Longhorn
Network whose revenues it did not share. 117 The mid-majors
likewise belong to the BCS out of economic necessity. With smaller
conference television contracts and perhaps smaller stadia, their
only hope to share in the BCS payday is to join even on
inequitable terms. Universities, like the University of Utah, in the
mid-major conferences flee those conferences for BCS-automatic
qualifying conferences primarily for economic reasons. Likewise,
mid-major conferences like Conference USA, the Mountain West
and the Sunbelt may seek to merge or expand in response to
raiding by the BCS automatic qualifying conferences.
men and women competed under the WAC name. Fresno State was added in 1992, and
then in 1996, the women's programs from Air Force and Hawai'i along with six new
schools (UNLV, Rice, San Jose State, SMU, TCU and Tulsa) came into the WAC. Air
Force, Brigham Young, Colorado State, UNLV, New Mexico, San Diego State, Utah
and
Wyoming
withdrew
on
June
30,
1999,
http://www.wacsports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID=10100&ATCLID=537066.
11 NCAA MANUAL, Art. 2.5 ("Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained
as a vital component of the educational program, and student- athletics shall be an
integral part of the student body.").
116Michael A. Corgan, Comments, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept
Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the FinancialCorruption of College Athletics Created
by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA's Revenue- Generating Scheme, 19 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 391-92 (2012); Taconi, supra note 27, at n.284.
11 Andy Staples, Texas' Longhorn Network sparking another Big 12 Missile Crisis,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED.COM
July
21,
2011,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/andy-staples/
07/21/longhorn- networkbig-12/index.html
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Those moves, however, may conflict with the educational
missions of member institutions and the NCAA mission to support
intercollegiate athletics. For example, traditional rivalries
between state and regional universities transcend the playing
arenas. The annual rivalry games between Harvard and Yale,
Alabama and Auburn, Southern Cal and UCLA, Texas and Texas
A&M, Texas and Oklahoma, Oklahoma and Nebraska, Oklahoma
and Oklahoma State, Duke and North Carolina, Utah and BYU,
New Mexico and Utah, Ole Miss and Mississippi State, New
Mexico and BYU, New Mexico and New Mexico State, Notre Dame
and Michigan, Oregon and Oregon State, Arizona and Arizona
State are far more than athletic events. They constitute vital parts
of the social environment for college students. Intercollegiate
athletics should also serve the social and educational development
of student athletics apart from their classroom work. Conventional
antitrust law only considers economic self-interest but in applying
that law to the major college football oligopoly, perhaps, the
educational missions of individual conference members should be
taken into account. Advancing their educational programs and
reputation is in the economic self-interest of those institutions.

b. PurposedBased Oligopoly
Professor Thomas Piraino has advocated a purpose based
approach to applying section 1 to oligopolies. 118 He joins the
criticism that the Sherman Act leads to an emphasis on finding an
agreement to engage in anticompetitive conduct in order to find
illegality. 119 Under his argument, the test of whether the major

1

Piraino, supra note 82, at 33-43.

119Id. at 12. Economically, there is no distinction between a meeting to fix prices
and "a situation in which two firms are sitting at their computer terminals rapidly
changing prices in response to the others' actions." Indeed, tacit coordinated conduct
among oligopolists may be more harmful to consumers than an overt price-fixing cartel.
Cartels are often undermined by cheating. In those few cases where they do persist,
cartels can be detected easily and punished by antitrust regulators. By contrast, tacit
coordination among a group of oligopolists is difficult to discover, and such conduct is
likely to be sustained for a longer period. Yet, according to many courts and
commentators, the Sherman Act would preclude the cartel and let the oligopolists
proceed with their tacit coordination. As a result, "some critics maintain that the
antitrust authorities are most successful against those conspiracies that are least likely
to succeed." Commentators have referred to this gap in the antitrust laws as the
'oligopoly problem.
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college football oligopoly has violated the antitrust laws should be
the purpose of the parallel conduct rather than whether members
of the oligopoly agreed. The raiding of conferences, the inequitable
revenue sharing in the BCS, and bowl tie-in agreements have real
economic effects regardless of whether the conferences agreed to
do them. Clearly, the conferences have undertaken these actions
to improve their competitive position and claim a larger share of
the market.
Professor Piraino argues that conduct against legitimate selfinterest by all firms in an oligopoly after having obtained
monopoly or oligopoly power should serve as a proxy for
anticompetitive conduct or harm to consumers. 120 Courts should
infer anticompetitive conduct whenever all of the firms in an
oligopoly engage in parallel conduct contrary to their independent
self-interest. 12 1 Under his purposed based approach, the focus on
the purpose for firms engaging in conduct would be the
"touchstone of illegality." 122 "Oligopoly firms should not be
permitted to engage in conduct that is contrary to "their
legitimate self-interest .

.

. and has no rational basis other than to

perpetuate or extend their monopoly power." 123 He would ask
courts to focus on the plus factors to determine the real
motivations of the firms engaged in parallel conduct. 124 Courts
would focus on evidence related to purpose rather than
economics.125

In examining the self-interest of the conferences, courts
would have to take into account the self-interests of conference
member institutions. The test should thus take into account the
commercial interests of conferences and the educational interests
of its members. Individual conferences have economic motives for
Id., at 43.
Id., at 37.
122 Id., at 35.
123 Id.
121 Id.
125 Id. at 42. Rather than complex economic factors such as concentration levels and
entry characteristics, fact finders should be discerning a defendant's motives for its
actions by determining the credibility of its witnesses, its explanation for its conduct,
and the relevance and significance of memoranda, minutes, handwritten notes, e-mails
and other documents that it has produced. Judges and juries are called upon daily to
use such means to determine the purpose of defendants' behavior in contract, tort,
employment, and criminal disputes.
120
121
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expansion. As noted above, larger conferences have the potential
for producing additional revenue through larger television
contracts and conference championship games. The major
conferences have the gravitational pull to draw in economically
strong universities from weaker conferences. The raiding
strengthens the major conference and weakens the mid-major.
The universities act out of their economic self-interest. Joining the
major conference will increase revenue from the conference
television share and the BCS revenues. Revenue enhancement
may not be in the overall economic self-interest of member
institutions either. Such institutions generally seek to maximize
revenues but not profits. 126 Actions to enhance revenues that
require additional expenditures that render the activity
unprofitable should be viewed as contrary to the self-interest of
member institutions, although not necessarily the conferences of
which they are members. Accordingly, not only may conference
expansion be inconsistent with educational values of individual
institutions, it may also conflict with the economic self-interest of
the overall institution.
Professor Piraino acknowledges that it is permissible for
oligopolies to obtain monopoly or oligopoly power through superior
efficiency, 127 but he argues that they should be subject to closer
scrutiny once they have obtained monopoly or oligopoly power.
Under this analysis, the conference expansion moves and BCS
agreements advantaging the current automatic qualifying
conferences should be scrutinized in the same way as a single firm
having achieved monopoly power.

c. Section 2 and the Case for Shared Monopoly
The major college football cartel could be challenged under
section 2 which also has a duality based offense. 128 Although
primarily directed toward the conduct of a single firm, Section 2
also reaches conspiracies to monopolize, the essence of a cartel.
See Mathewson, supra note 51, at 606, 615.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
121 "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony." 15 U.S.C. §2 (2007).
126
127
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However, such claims have received scant attention in case law
and legal scholarship. The elements of such an offense are
concerted action with the specific intent to monopolize and an
overt act in the furtherance of the conspiracy. 129 In the case of the
major college football cartel, there are several sets of overt acts:
the formation and structuring of the BCS to favor the BCSautomatic
qualifying
conferences,
conference
realignment
resulting in the formation of superconferences, the restructuring
of the Football Bowl Subdivision ,and the various bowl tie-in
agreements.
The probability of success for a Section 2 claim increases if a
showing of market power is not required. The courts are split over
whether the cartels must have market power. 130 At least one
commentator has argued that a showing of market power should
not be required, particularly in the context of sports leagues. 13 1 A
market power analysis would involve the control output and price
in the market for major college football, particularly the market
for televising major college football, and the market for postseasons bowls. Even if the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences
have sufficient market power to amount to monopoly power, it
does not mean a violation of section 2 if such power devolved upon
them through a superior product or skill. In fact, the eleven FBS
conferences necessarily control one hundred percent of the major
college football industry but the formation of the FBS in and of
itself would not violate section 2.
The weaknesses in potential Section 2 claims lead to further
inquiry about the application of the antitrust laws to major college
football industry as an oligopoly. The ability of the antitrust laws
to regulate oligopolistic behavior has been the subject of ongoing
debate in antitrust jurisprudence and scholarship. 132 In the early
1960's, substantial attention was given to tackling the "oligopoly
problem." 133 The solution building on American Tobacco Co. v.

129 David Woods, Note, Hybrid Single Entities and the Market Power Requirement
for Conspiracies to Monopolize Following Fraser: Are Courts Putting Form Over
Substance?, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1261, 1267-68.

1so Id., at 1262-63.

13, Id.
Piraino, supra note 82, at 9.
133 See, for example, Turner supra, note 83.
132
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United States134 was the "shared monopoly" doctrine. The shared
monopoly theory targeted the structure of oligopolies rather than
agreement or conduct. Market structure rather than agreement
was the key. The theory never gained traction in law or the
courts. 135 Critics maintain that the theory failed because it would
have treated firms in an oligopoly more harshly than a single firm
having obtained monopoly power. 136 The doctrine is still a topic of
scholarly discussion as other commentators have observed a
paradox resulting from the oligopoly problem. The agreement
requirement in the Sherman Act thus condemns conspiracies that
are least anticompetitive and permits practices that are most
anticompetitive. 137
The major college football oligopoly presents an instance in
which collusive practices are indeed likely to succeed and an
appropriate case for the application of the shared monopoly
doctrine. In American Tobacco, three companies dominated the
market by engaging in practices that had the effect of fixing
prices. The Court found the power to exclude others a significant
issue even in the absence of proof of actual exclusion. In the major
college oligopoly, the BCS-automatic qualifying conferences
dominate the major college football market, including the
television for regular season and post-season broadcasts, the BCS
and other post-season bowls. They have shown the power to
exclude in the BCS agreements in which the non-automatic
qualifying conferences have a substantially smaller probability of
participation. They have participated in the promulgation and
maintenance of NCAA bylaws that either excludes colleges and
universities from participating in or serve as barriers to entry in
the FBS.138

1L1

328 U.S. 721 (1946) (three major tobacco manufacturing companies were held
liable under section 2 even no one company held monopoly power without proof an
agreement because they were capable jointly acting to raise prices).
13' Hawk, supra note 96, at 63.
16 A single firm with monopoly power does not violate section unless it unlawfully
acquired or maintained its monopoly power. The shared monopoly doctrine would have
imposed liability on firms in oligopoly based on their possession of monopoly power.
17 Piraino, supra note 82, at 13.
138Christopher B. Norris, Comment, Trick Play: Are The NCAA's New Division I-A
Requirements An Illegal Boycott?, 56 SMU L. REV. 2355 (2003).
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Borrowing concepts from European competition law with
statutory parallels to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act may
frame an even stronger case. 139 The shared monopoly concept is
alive and well in the European competition law under the rubric of
collective dominance. 140 The collective dominance doctrine arises
out of different statutory language, particularly under article 82,
which expressly applies to "one or more undertakings of a
dominant position." 141 One commentator argues that an analysis
of the European Commission case law evinces a three part test for
determining collective dominance under article 82. Collective
dominance exists where the undertakings, a group of firms,
constitute a collective entity in a relevant market, the collective
entity holds a dominant position, and the collective entity engages
in conduct constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade. 142
He argues that the collective entity prong, an idea somewhat
similar but not identical to the single entity concept in the
Sherman Act jurisprudence, has been the most important element
of the doctrine. 143 To fall within the element, the multiple firms
must hold themselves out as an entity. 144 There are two instances
in which this collective entity standard with its holding out
requirement may fit the major college football oligopoly.
The first is the Football Bowl Subdivision. The eleven
conferences hold themselves out as presenting a different class or
category of college football. They collectively influence and develop
the rules governing the subdivision. Second, the BCS may not
have legal status as an entity but it certainly has entity status in
the economic sense. Again the eleven affiliated conferences,

19 The counterparts are Art. 8lof the Treaty establishing the European Community
("Treaty") (akin to Section 1) "The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade . . . and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition . . ."; Art. 82
of the Treaty (akin to Section 2) "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited. . ."
110 Hawk, supra note 96, at 75; Barry Rodger, The Oligopoly Problem and the
Concept of Collective Dominance: EC Developments in the Light of U.S. Trends in
Antitrust Law And Policy, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 25 (1996).
Mn Art. 82 of the Treaty.
112

Hawk, supra note 96 at 76.

113 Id.
III

Id.
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automatic qualifying and non-automatic qualifying conferences,
hold the arrangement out as producing a match-up in a BCS of the
top two ranked teams and four additional highly competitive bowl
games.
Another commentator reviewing the decision in Re Italian
Flat Glass: Industria Vebraria Alfonso Cabelli v. Societa Italiano
Vetro-SIV SpA and Others,145 argues that it is possible for
multiple separate legal entities to constitute a collective entity
where there are sufficient economic links.146 He points out that
the European Commission has construed the "one or more
undertakings" language in article 82 to mean it can reach firms
that are independent economic units if there is economic linkage
between
them. 147 The linkage
is not limited to the
parent/subsidiary context. Again, the eleven FBS conferences have
economic links in the organization of the FBS. Moreover, the BCS
clearly provides economic linkage among the BCS-automatic
qualifying conferences and to a lesser extent including the nonautomatic qualifying conference. The economic linkage notion is
consistent with American Tobacco.
There is also section five of the Federal Trade Commission
Act and its prohibition of unfair methods of competition. 148 The
shared monopoly doctrine did not gain traction under the FTC Act
either. 149 The attractiveness of the application of the FTC Act in
the case of the major college football oligopoly is the potential for a
regulatory solution given the failure of self-regulation.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO ANTITRUST
The shared monopoly of the automatic qualifying conferences
cries out for regulation but the antitrust regime is lacking.
Assuming the major college football oligopoly is actionable under
the antitrust laws, there remains the issue of remedies.
Traditional antitrust remedies such as breaking up the oligopoly

11 1989 O.J. (L 33) 44, 1990 C.M.L.R. 535.
116Rodger, supra note 129, at 44-46.
117 Id.

"1 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (2007); see George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly and the
Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982).
I9 See Lee Goldman, Oligopoly Policy and the Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. REV. 73
(1986).

2012]

Revolution Not Reform

353

would be unwieldy and probably unfeasible. The specter of
conferences paying treble damages to other conferences or to
universities would only add to the economic stress of major college
athletics.1 50 Injunctive relief would have to be circumscribed but it
may have the effect of courts replacing the NCAA as the primary
regulator of intercollegiate athletics with a federal judge. A very
recent student note stakes out ground applying the competition
law provisions in the Treaty of Rome to the BCS.151 She suggests
borrowing the relegation system from the English Premier Soccer
Leagues pursuant to which conferences would be realigned
annually based upon performance. 152 Recent modifications to the
BCS provide a framework similar to the relegation system under
which a mid-major conference may attain automatic qualifying
status through a performance evaluation over four-year periods. 153
This remedy, however, only applies to the BCS and does not
address other anticompetitive practices of the oligopoly.
The antitrust regime does apply to intercollegiate athletics
but commerce-based antitrust principles have limited puissance to
regulate the dominance of the automatic qualifying conferences.
The BCS, for example, was founded in 1998 and there continues to
be lively scholarly and public debate but not litigation over
whether it violates the antitrust laws. The current oligopoly rose
after the Supreme Court opened the door in applying the antitrust
laws to the NCAA's television contract. Moreover, antitrust
principles are not well-equipped to address the educational nexus
of the major college football industry. In many ways, critics of the
BCS have looked to the antitrust laws to resolve an issue with
which educational policy is indelibly intertwined.

1 0 However, there is precedent for a court ordering a league to pay damages to a
league member. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 397, 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984).
11 Deanna Brock, BCS Europa: An Analysis of the Bowl Championship Series
under the European Commission White Paperon Sport, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303,
335-39 (2011).
152 Id.
1-, Id., at 309. The BCS framework provides for the possibility for the addition of a
seventh automatic qualifier to the current six automatic qualifying conferences. See
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819597.
The latest wave of conference
expansion raiding Conference USA and the Mountain West Conference have reduced
the probability of a seventh conference.
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If the antitrust laws do not contain an appropriate regulatory
solution then perhaps the answer lies in self-regulation, although
it has failed to prevent the economic crisis now confronting
intercollegiate athletics. To be fair, as noted in a previous section,
the NCAA has been constrained by the Supreme Court in
addressing the regulation of economic issues. The legal framework
has led to a further divide between the intercollegiate athletics as
an integral part of the educational programs of universities and
commercial character of intercollegiate athletics. NCAA v. Board
of Regents is not the only case contributing to the regulatory
debacle. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held that the
NCAA was not a state actor even though its member institutions
may be. 154 The decision in Tarkanian was buttressed by NCAA v.
Miller with its holding that state regulation of the internal affairs
of the NCAA violated the commerce clause. 155 As a result, it
limited the power of states to regulate the NCAA. Then in NCAA
v. Smith, 15 6 it held that the NCAA was not an education
institution within the meaning of Title IX, even though its
university and college members are. So, the NCAA may not
regulate the economic structure of intercollegiate athletics and its
arms race in major college football; states may not regulate the
NCAA; and even the federal government is limited in its ability to
regulate the NCAA. . It is no wonder the major college football
oligopoly has arisen.
Add to this mess, the Supreme Court's condoning of an
economic system in which it is an antitrust violation to fix prices
in all areas of intercollegiate athletics except the compensation of
student athletes. 15 7 As noted above, the NCAA may not fix the
price of television broadcasts of intercollegiate athletics by its
member institutions. It also may not fix the price of coaches'
compensation. 158 Nor may universities collude to fix the

488 U.S. 179 (1988).
10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1543 (1994).
lu
525 U.S. 459 (1999)(receipt of federal funds by member institutions does not
subject NCAA to Title IX).
Dennie, supra note 65, at (arguing that current litigation may transform the
amateurism of intercollegiate athletics).

11

Supra note 63.
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compensation of law professors. 159 And there is a question as to
whether universities may collude to fix the amount of nonathletics related financial aid awards to common applicants.1 60 It
is not an unreasonable conclusion that every category of person in
the university setting is protected against price-fixing except
student athletes. 16 1 The major college football oligopoly is in no
hurry to change this legal order. It is far too late for reform; the
time has come for a revolution.
There are two legal regimes under which intercollegiate
athletics may be primarily regulated; one based on commerce and
one based on education.162 I favor educational primacy.
Intercollegiate athletics should be an integral part of the
educational programs of institutions of higher education.163
However, intercollegiate athletics, especially basketball and
football, have substantial commercial value. Because the
institutions that produce the commercial activity are educational
in value, educational primacy should be the driving principle of
any regulatory scheme. Accordingly, I am reluctantly proposing to
sanction self-regulation by the NCAA with a limited exemption
from the antitrust laws so that it may regulate the economic
structure of intercollegiate athletics, but at a price. 164 Any such

1" Press Release, Justice Department and American Bar Association Resolve
Charges That the ABA's Process for Accrediting Law Schools Was Misused,
Department of Justice, June 27, 1995; U.S. v. American Bar Ass'n, Complaint, Civ.
Action, (filed June 27, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0200/0254.pdf; Final
Judgment, Civ. Action 95-1211, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/flOOO/1037.htm .
"I0 U.S. v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (court declines to hold that
Overlap Group formed by Ivy League institutions to equalize need based financial aid
awards to common applicants is illegal under the antitrust laws but justification while
understandable is questionable).
16,Stephen Ukeily, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship
Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167 (1996).
162 See generally, Mathewson, supra note 51; for comparisons of amateur/education
and commercial/education models of intercollegiate athletics; Michael P. Acain,
Revenue Sharing:A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 307, 311-13 (1998).
1u8See supra note 159.
1 Various constituent groups within the governing apparatus of the NCAA have
considered applying for an exemption but have deemed it unlikely to succeed and have
not pushed it. The Second Century Imperatives, Presidential Leadership -Institutional
Accountability, A Report from the Presidential Task Force on the Future of Division I
Intercollegiate
Athletics
21
(2006),
available
at
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exemption would necessarily have to address the compensation
and publicity rights of student athletes. Because the NCAA has
shown that it is susceptible to abusing its monopoly control of
intercollegiate athletics, it should itself be subject to regulation. I
would acknowledge educational primacy in intercollegiate
athletics by subjecting the NCAA to oversight by the Department
of Education. 16 5 The constitution of the NCAA provides that
intercollegiate athletics is an integral part of the educational
programs of its member universities. 166 Conferences, just like the
NCAA, are athletic governing organizations for which the
educational missions of member institutions are secondary to the
conference mission to regulate intercollegiate athletics. While the
Department of Education is not an education organization, its
primary mission is the regulation of education.
CONCLUSION
The economic problems of intercollegiate athletics have
become intractable. The Bowl Championship Series and the
considerable attention to its financial largesse has led to
supporters of the non-automatic qualifying conferences almost
exclusively focusing on its legality to the exclusion of other equally
significant aspects of the economic structure of the major college
football industry. While the industry is subject to regulation by
the antitrust laws, those laws may not provide the answer. The
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents opened the door for the
evolution of the industry into an oligopoly. The excesses of the

http://facsen.wsu.edu/items-of-interest/athletics/NCAA/NCAAPresidentialTaskForcefi
nalreportOctO6.pdf
I" I hesitate to recommend governmental regulation of athletics but something
different-a revolution-is now required.
T66 NCAA MANUAL, art. 1.3.1. Integral part of an educational programs should
mean more than whether a university graduates its student athletes. Traditional
rivalries between state and regional universities transcend the playing arenas. The
annual Harvard and Yale, Southern Cal and UCLA, Texas and Texas A&M, Texas and
Oklahoma, Alabama and Auburn, Oklahoma and Nebraska, Oklahoma and Oklahoma
State, Duke and North Carolina, Utah and BYU, New Mexico and Utah, Ole Miss and
Mississippi State, New Mexico and BYU, New Mexico and New Mexico State, Notre
Dame and Michigan, Oregon and Oregon State, Arizona and Arizona State are far
more than athletic events. They constitute vital parts of the social environment for
college students. Intercollegiate athletics should also serve the social and educational
development of student athletics apart from their classroom work.
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oligopoly may prove to be no more illegal thereunder than the
Bowl Championship Series which has been tweaked from time to
time to enhance its legality. Nevertheless, this article has outlined
the framework for examining the industry under an antitrust
lens. Even if oligopolistic practices may be successfully challenged,
an appropriate remedy is illusive. This article therefore proposes
to address the problem by enhancing self-regulation by the NCAA
through a limited exemption from the antitrust laws and
buttressing it with oversight by the Department of Education. It is
time
for
revolution,
not
reform.
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